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Notes
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON REPRESSED
MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE IN LOGERQUIST v.
McVEY: RELIABILITY TAKES A BACKSEAT TO RELEVANCY
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, the number of reported incidents of child-
hood sexual abuse has increased in America.' Among the emerging vic-
tims are those adults who claim they suffered sexual abuse as a child but
were unable to remember the abuse until years later.2 A recent trend
1. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEG-
LECr 3-6 to 3-7 (1996) (reporting statistics on child abuse and neglect); PANEL ON
RESEARCH ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF
MED., UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 78 (1993) (same); see also Joy
Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert Testimony on Repressed Memory, 28 Lov. L.A. L.
REV. 1345, 1348-54 (1995) (describing prevalence of childhood sexual abuse). In
1980, 42,900 children reportedly suffered from sexual abuse, which accounted for
an estimated 0.7 per 1000 children. See SEDLAK & BROADHURST, supra, at 3-3 (pro-
viding statistics on child abuse and neglect). By 1986, the number of occurrences
of children experiencing sexual abuse increased to an estimated 1.9 per 1000 chil-
dren, accounting for a total of 119,200 victims. See id. at 3-3, 3-7. This number
continued to rise to 217,700 children (an estimated 3.2 per 1000 children) in
1993. See id. at 3-3, 3-7.
2. See Wendy J. Kisch, From the Couch to the Bench: How Should the Legal System
Respond to Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 207,
208-09 (1996) (noting increase in women reporting repressed childhood sexual
abuse); see also Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 479, 486-87 (1997) (explaining that attention to childhood sexual
abuse flourished beginning in late 1970s and current focus is parents wronged by
suits based on false accusations). A large increase in the number of adults accus-
ing parents of child sexual abuse emerged in the late 1980s to early 1990s. See
Eleanor Goldstein, False Memory Syndrome: Why Would They Believe Such Terrible
Things if They Weren't True?, 25 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 307, 307-08 (1997) (acknowl-
edging crescendo of accusations in late 1980s and early 1990s).
Eleanor Goldstein identifies three trends that may explain increased report-
ing of potentially false memories. See id. at 307-08 (explaining trends based on
four years of research). First, public access to mind-altering techniques increased,
including access to "hypnosis to retrieve so-called memories, use of visualization
and imagery techniques, journaling, age regression exercises, body memory work,
peer pressure, and careless use of drugs that are often hallucinatory." Id. at 307.
Second, several movements emerged that stressed "intuition and feelings over sci-
ence and evidence," including the recovery movement and feminist movement.
See id. at 308 (discussing trends leading to increased reporting of repressed child-
hood sexual abuse). Third, the sexual revolution created sexual problems for
adults that neither parents nor therapists could tackle, such as inability to commit
to relationships and reduction in sexual pleasure due to dangers from sexually
transmitted diseases. See id. (same).
(385)
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among these "repressed" child victims of sexual abuse is their use of the
legal system to seek redress for harm resulting from the abuse and their
reliance upon experts to explain the repressed memory phenomenon. 3
An initial barrier to legal claims involving repressed memories is the
statute of limitations, which holds claims time-barred if not filed within a
specified period.4 Many states, however, now permit repressed child sex-
3. See Douglas R. Richmond, Bad Science: Repressed and Recovered Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 517, 519 (1996) (noting increase in
repressed memory claims); Carol McHugh, Suits Claiming Childhood Sex Abuse on
Rise; Lawyers, Experts Question "Recovered Memories", CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22,
1993, at 1 (same). Repression is the popularized term that explains how a child
victim of sexual abuse places memories of the abuse into his or her unconscious
and later recalls the abuse. See Bertram P. Karon & Anmarie J. Widener, Repressed
Memories: Just the Facts, 29 PROF. PSCYHOL.: RIS. & PRAc. 625, 625 (1998) ("Repres-
sion refers to the psychological process of keeping something out of awareness
because of unpleasant affect connected with it."); see also KENNETH S. POPE &
LAURA S. BROWN, RECOVERED MEMORIES OF ABUSE: ASSESSMENT, THERAPY, FOREN-
sics 46 (1996) ("The term repression has gained enormous popular currency as a
mechanism used to describe how it is that people subjected to traumatic exper-
iences in childhood might forget and then recall these events."). According to
one scholar, three elements define the phenomenon:
(1) repression is the selective forgetting of materials that cause the indi-
vidual pain;
(2) repression is not under voluntary control; and
(3) repressed material is not lost but instead is stored in the unconscious
and can be returned to consciousness if the anxiety that is associated
with the memory is removed.
David S. Holmes, The Evidence for Repression: An Examination of Sixty Years of Re-
search, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME 149, 150 (Robert A.
Parker ed., 1998) (citation omitted).
Although the legal system prefers to use the term repression, clinicians have
proffered other terms to describe the phenomenon, including dissociative amne-
sia and traumatic amnesia. See DANIEL BROWN ET AL., MEMORY, TRAUMA TREAT-
MENT, AND THIE LAW 578 (1998) (explaining different terms applicable to repressed
memory phenomenon). Some proponents prefer to describe the unconscious re-
moval of memories from conscious control as dissociative amnesia, especially given
that the American Psychiatric Association ("APA") incorporates it within its diag-
nostic nomenclature. SeeJudith L. Alpert et al., Symptomatic Clients and Memories of
Childhood Abuse: What the Trauma and Child Sexual Abuse Literature Tells Us, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 941, 962-65 (1998) [hereinafter Symptomatic Clients] (ex-
plaining that clinicians prefer term dissociation over repression and describing dis-
sociation process). See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 478-81 (4th ed. 1994) (describing diag-
nostic features and criteria for dissociative amnesia); Bessel A. van der Kolk, Trau-
matic Memories, in TRAUMA AND MEMORY 243, 248-52 (Paul S. Appelbaum et al. eds.,
1997) (discussing traumatic amnesia and dissociation). But see William M. Grove &
R. Christopher Barden, Protecting the Integrity of the Legal System: The Admissibility of
Testimony from Mental Health Experts Under Daubert/Kumho Analyses, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 224, 236 (1999) (concluding that dissociative identity disorder is
"one of the least generally accepted of all [psychiatric] diagnoses"). Because
courts tend to use the term repression in their analyses, this Note uses the term
repression to describe the phenomenon by which a child victim of sexual abuse is
unable to recall the abuse until years later.
4. SeeJorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extending Statutes
of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We Gone
[Vol. 46: p. 385
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ual abuse cases to proceed to a verdict by applying the discovery rule,
which stops the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff dis-
covers or should have discovered all the facts essential to the claim. 5 Nev-
ertheless, even if the law tolls the statute of limitations in these cases, it is
essential to the victim's claim to use experts to explain the delay between
the occurrence of the alleged abuse and the filing of the claim. 6
The psychiatric and psychological community, however, is divided
over whether any reliable scientific support exists to validate repressed
memories. 7 The concerns raised by the scientific community are para-
Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. Rv. 1239, 1250-55 (1996) (explaining impact of statute of
limitations and discovery rule exceptions on repressed child sexual abuse claims);
Gary M. Emsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 141 (1993) (describing statute of limitations as "major obstacle"
for adult survivor).
5. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3, at 591 (explaining status of state laws re-
garding delayed discovery rule in repressed memory cases); Lonnie Brian Richard-
son, Notes & Comments, Missing Pieces of Memory: A Rejection of "Type" Classifications
and a Demand for a More Subjective Approach Regarding Adult Survivors of Childhood
Sexual Abuse, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 515, 528 (1999) (noting that twenty-eight
states have applied discovery rule to child sexual abuse claims).
Some jurisdictions apply the discovery rule through judicial interpretation of
case law. See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 4, at 144-45 (noting increasing exam-
ples ofjudicial tolling of statute of limitations in repressed memory cases). Others
rely on the legislature to enact statutes that will toll the statute of limitations in
sexual abuse cases. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3, at 591 (identifying states that
have enacted legislation to apply discovery rule to repressed memory cases); Ern-
sdorff & Loftus, supra note 4, at 145-47 (identifying states that have enacted legisla-
tion to toll statute of limitations in repressed memory cases). Courts also differ as
to when the rule applies. See Richardson, supra, at 528-29 (explaining delayed dis-
covery rule and differing approaches to when rule applies in child sexual abuse
cases). See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Running of Limitations
Against Action for Civil Damages for Sexual Abuse of Child 9 A.L.R.5TH 321 (1993)
(collecting cases addressing when statute of limitations runs in child sexual abuse
cases).
6. See Richmond, supra note 3, at 519 (explaining that "[c]ourts and litigants
want scientific verification of repressed and recovered memories of childhood
abuse").
7. Compare Symptomatic Clients, supra note 3, at 968-75 (describing results of
studies that support conclusion that repression exists), with Peter A. Ornstein et
al., Comment on Alpert, Brown, and Courtois (1998): The Science of Memory and the Prac-
tice of Psychotherapy, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 996, 999 (1998) [hereinafter Science
of Memory] (criticizing studies relied upon by proponents and finding "little empiri-
cal support" for dissociation); see also Lynn Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Memory with
Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and Its Potential Legal
Implications, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. Rxv. 103, 108-16 (1998) (identifying views of propo-
nents and opponents of repressed memory); Kisch, supra note 2, at 212-15 (same).
Proponents of repressed memory hypothesize that a child victim of sexual
abuse places the trauma into his or her unconscious to alleviate the anxiety and
other psychological effects that memories of the event invoke. See POPE & BROWN,
supra note 3, at 46 (explaining repression); Jennifer Freyd, Betrayal Trauma: Trau-
matic Amnesia as an Adaptive Response to Childhood Abuse, 4 ETHICS & BEHAV. 307, 312
(1994) (finding that child abuse "by its very nature requires that information about
the abuse be blocked from mental mechanisms");Judith Lewis Herman, Crime and
3
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mount to the legal decision to admit such testimony at trial, and courts
Memory, 23 BULL. Am. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 7-9 (1995) (explaining that terror
alters consciousness and leads to dissociative reactions). Proponents view trauma
as correlated to repressed memories and embrace four implicit assumptions: (1)
the mind can accurately record detailed memories; (2) traumatic memories often
are repressed, particularly memories of sexual abuse; (3) traumatic experiences
that are more severe are less likely to be remembered; and (4) repressed memories
are accessible through different techniques, including psychotherapy. See Joel
Paris, A Critical Review of Recovered Memories in Psychotherapy: Part I - Trauma and
Memory, 41 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 201, 201 (1996) (reviewing evidence for as-
sumptions underlying proponent perspective).
To support their position, proponents stress the large number of clinical cases
of repressed memories and corroborated stories of repressed childhood sexual
abuse. See Ross E. Cheit, Consider This, Skeptics of Recovered Memory, 8 ETHICS &
BEHAV. 141, 142, 151-60 (1998) (explaining that opponent view overlooks corrobo-
rated stories of repressed childhood sexual abuse and providing list of thirty-five
corroborated stories); Bertram P. Karon & Anmarie J. Widener, Repressed Memories:
The Real Story, 29 PROF. PSYCHOL.: REs. & PRAC. 482, 483 (1998) (citing hundreds
of cases of World War II veterans who repressed memories of battlefield trauma).
But see Harrison G. Pope, Jr. et al., Repressed Memories: Scientific Status of Research on
Repressed Memories, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 13-2.1.2, at 154, 161-62 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., Supp.
2000) [hereinafter Repressed Memories] (explaining that false positive reports are
inevitable in large numbers of reported observations of repression by clinicians);
August Piper, Jr., A Skeptic Considers, Then Responds to Cheit, 9 ETHICS & BEHAV. 277,
278-90 (1999) (identifying seven flaws in corroborated studies identified by Cheit,
including failure to provide relevant case facts that undermine conclusions).
Several studies on amnesia for childhood sexual abuse reveal that victims do
report amnesia for the traumatic event or fail to recall the memory when asked
about the event years later. SeeJohn Briere & Jon Conte, Self-Reported Amnesia for
Abuse in Adults Molested As Children, 6J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 21, 21-31 (1993) (finding
that sixty percent of 420 women and 30 men in outpatient therapy setting exper-
ienced amnesia for childhood sexual abuse); Linda Meyer Williams, Recall of Child-
hood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women's Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167, 1167-74 (1994) (finding that participants
failed to report or chose not to disclose childhood sexual abuse that occurred
seventeen years earlier); see also Andrew D. Reisner, Repressed Memories: True and
False, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME, supra note 3, at 193,
200-05 (reviewing survey studies and case studies and concluding that empirical
support exists for repression); Alan W. Scheflin & Daniel Brown, Repressed Memory
or Dissociative Amnesia: What the Science Says, 24 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 143, 146-79
(1996) (summarizing twenty-five studies and concluding that amnesia for child-
hood sexual abuse is "robust finding" because amnesia occurred in all studies);
Symptomatic Clients, supra note 3, at 969-74 (describing results of studies that sup-
port conclusion that repression exists).
Opponents of repressed memory seriously question a person's ability to re-
press and recall memories, and they view repressed memories of abuse as more
false than true. See Harrison G. Pope, Jr. et al., Can Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse Be Repressed?, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME, supra
note 3, at 169, 172-76 (finding that four studies relied upon by proponents failed
to demonstrate that participants suffered amnesia for abuse). A review of sixty-
three studies on trauma survivors supports this position as "none of the more than
10,000 victims" participating in the studies reportedly repressed the traumatic
memories. Repressed Memories, supra, § 13-2.1.1, at 155-57 (providing table of stud-
ies on trauma survivors and examining studies for repression); see Holmes, supra
note 3, at 151-61 (reviewing studies over past sixty years and finding no support for
repression); Paris, supra, at 204 (explaining that "recovered memories are more
4
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now must address whether to admit expert testimony on repressed memo-
ries.8 Courts differ, however, as to what evidentiary standard applies to
likely to be false memories"); Science of Memory, supra, at 999 (criticizing studies
relied upon by proponents and finding "little empirical support" for dissociation).
Opponents rely upon the accepted view in the community that recall of mem-
ories is not free of infallibility. See Peter A. Ornstein et al., Adult Recollections of
Childhood Abuse: Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
1025, 1027-30 (1998) [hereinafter Adult Recollections] (identifying problems with
memory); Paris, supra, at 202 (explaining inaccuracies of memory). Specifically,
they emphasize that not all events get into memory because the brain is selective
on what events a person attends to and processes. Adult Recollections, supra, at 1027
(discussing problems with memory); Paris, supra, at 202 (same). Additionally, even
if the brain processes an event into long-term memory, several factors influence a
person's ability to trace the event, including: "the amount of exposure to a particu-
lar event (both in terms of the length of exposure and the number of repetitions),
the age of the individual, and the salience of the event (with highly salient exper-
iences surviving longer [than] less salient ones)." Adult Recollections, supra, at 1027-
28.
Opponents also emphasize that memory recovery techniques used in therapy
may operate to implant false memories of abuse. See Ira E. Hyman, Jr. & Elizabeth
F. Loftus, Some People Recover Memories of Childhood Trauma That Never Really Hap-
pened, in TRAUMA AND MEMORY, supra note 3, at 3, 10-14 (explaining how therapy
can create false memories); see also Joel Paris, A Critical Review of Recovered Memories
in Psychotherapy: Part II - Trauma and Therapy, 41 CANADIANJ. PSYCHIATRY 206, 208-
09 (1996) (cautioning against use of recovery techniques until empirical support
for techniques exist); J.T. Stocks, Recovered Memory Therapy: A Dubious Practice Tech-
nique, 43 Soc. WORK 423, 431 (1998) (reviewing empirical studies and finding cli-
ents "deteriorat[ed] ... [a]fter entering recovered memory therapy"). Moreover,
several methodological flaws undermine the studies relied upon by proponents,
including: (1) failure to provide alternative explanations for findings; (2) reliance
on correlational rather than multifactorial analyses; (3) small sample sizes; (4) lack
of longitudinal and cross-validation designs; and (5) lack of outside corroboration
to demonstrate accuracy. See Symptomatic Clients, supra note 3, at 961 (identifying
methodological problems with studies relied upon by proponents); see also
Holmes, supra note 3, at 151-61 (finding methodological flaws in and alternative
interpretations for findings supporting proponent position); Henry L. Roediger,
III & Erik T. Bergman, The Controversy Over Recovered Memories, 4 PSYCHOL; PUB.
POL'Y & L. 1091, 1102 (1998) (finding that "methodological limitations" of studies
relied upon by proponent "render most of [the proponent's] conclusions remark-
ably tentative and speculative, at best").
8. See Kisch, supra note 2, at 225 (asserting that "law must carefully examine
weight it gives" repressed memory evidence because of scientific controversy); see
also Cynthia V. McAlister, Comment, The Repressed Memory Phenomenon: Are Recovered
Memories Scientifically Valid Evidence Under Daubert, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 56, 71-72 (ex-
plaining that repressed memory phenomenon lies outside knowledge ofjury). Al-
though most jurisdictions find lay and expert testimony on behavioral
characteristics of child victims of sexual abuse relevant to sexual abuse claims,
some reject the testimony as inconsequential because the jury is familiar with the
behaviors at issue. See Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Ky. 1996)
(rejecting testimony regarding propensity of child victims of sexual abuse to recant
honest accusations of abuse because theory failed reliability analysis, lacked rele-
vance and implied guilt or innocence in particular case); Commonwealth v. Dun-
kle, 602 A.2d 830, 836-38 (Pa. 1992) (rejecting testimony explaining why child
victims of sexual abuse delay or omit reporting for lack of relevance because expla-
nation was within knowledge ofjury); see also Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testi-
mony: Seeking an Appropriate Admissibility Standard for Behavioral Science in Child
2001] NOTE
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such testimony.9 Some jurisdictions apply a heightened evidentiary stan-
dard by requiring the trial court to assess the reliability of the expert testi-
mony; others merely require that the testimony pass on general relevance
grounds-an admittedly low-level evidentiary standard.10 In a recent deci-
sion, Logerquist v. McVey," the Supreme Court of Arizona joined an inter-
mediate court in California to become the only courts that admit expert
testimony on repressed memories on relevancy grounds. 12
This Note discusses the Supreme Court of Arizona's holding in light
of other federal and state court decisions on the admissibility of expert
testimony about repressed memories. Part II overviews the evidentiary
standards applied to expert testimony generally and repressed memories
specifically. 13 Part III describes the facts giving rise to the decision in
Logerquist.14 Part IV outlines the Logerquist court's approach in permitting
expert testimony on repressed memories.15 Part V examines the court's
conclusions regarding the admissibility of repressed memory testimony. 16
Part VI analyzes the likely impact of the Supreme Court of Arizona's deci-
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 48 DuKE L.J. 933, 961-68 (1999) (analyzing case law in
jurisdictions that permit and deny expert testimony on behavioral characteristics
of child victims of sexual abuse).
9. See David L. Faigman et al., Repressed Memories: The Legal Relevance of Re-
search on Repressed Memories, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCI-
ENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 7, § 13-1.3, at 528, 532-34 (1997), 148, 151-
52 (Supp. 2000) (giving overview of evidentiary issues facing courts addressing ad-
missibility of repressed memory testimony); cf Steele, supra note 8, at 961-72 (ex-
plaining state paradigms in applying evidentiary standard to behavioral evidence in
child sexual abuse prosecutions).
10. Compare Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 287-90 (D. Mass. 1996)
(applying reliability standard), Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1064-
66 (E.D. Mich.. 1995) (same), State v. Walters, 698 A.2d 1244, 1246-48 (N.H. 1997)
(same), State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916, 925-34 (N.H. 1997) (same), State v.
Quattrocchi, No. P92-3759, 1999 WL 284882, at *9-16 (R.I. Super. Apr. 26, 1999)
(applying reliability and general acceptance standard), and Franklin v. Stevenson,
987 P.2d 22, 27-28 (Utah 1999) (applying reliability standard), with Wilson v. Phil-
lips, 73 Cal. App. 4th 250, 255 (1999) (applying relevancy standard), cert denied,
No.S081229, 1999 Cal. LEXIS 7143, at *1 (Oct. 6, 1999).
11. 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc).
12. See id. at 123, 134 (holding that relevancy standard applies to expert opin-
ion testimony on repressed memories).
13. For a further discussion of the development of evidentiary standards re-
lated to expert testimony, see infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text. For a fur-
ther discussion of the approach by federal and state courts in analyzing the
admissibility of expert testimony on repressed memories, see infra notes 37-64 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of Arizona case law addressing the
admissibility of expert testimony generally and expert testimony on repressed
memories, see infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the facts giving rise to the Supreme Court of
Arizona's holding in Logerquist, see infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of Arizona's approach in
analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony on repressed memories in Loger-
quist, see infra notes 99-162 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the criticisms of the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona's analysis in Logerquist, see infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46: p. 385
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sion regarding the admissibility of repressed memory testimony in child-
hood sexual abuse cases. 17
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evidentiary Standards Applicable to Expert Testimony
1. General Acceptance Standard
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit adopted the first standard for admitting expert testimony in Frye v.
United States.18 In Frye, the court explained that novel scientific testimony
is admissible only when the scientific principles underlying the evidence
are generally accepted in the particular field. 19 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court adopted the general acceptance standard as an absolute
prerequisite to the admissibility of scientific evidence.20 The court, how-
ever, failed to cite any authority for its ruling or to provide any specific
guidance on how to apply this narrowly proscribed standard.2 1 Neverthe-
less, federal and state courts applied Frye to unfamiliar scientific and pseu-
doscientific evidence with little or no reasoning or criticism. 22 This
17. For a further discussion of the potential effects resulting from the Su-
preme Court of Arizona's decision in Logerquist, see infra notes 188-98 and accom-
panying text.
18. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923) (setting forth evidentiary standard).
19. See id. at 1014 (setting forth evidentiary standard). The defendant sought
to introduce at trial expert testimony on the results of a systolic blood pressure test
administered to the defendant and testimony on the theory that a rise in systolic
blood pressure indicates deception. See id. at 1013-14. The trial court excluded
the testimony and denied defense counsel's request to have the expert administer
the test in open court. See id. at 1014.
20. See David L. Faigman et al., The Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scien-
tific Evidence, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY, supra note 7, § 1-2.2, at 1, 7-10 (1997) (recognizing creation of stan-
dard but criticizing its lack of clarity regarding when evidence reaches general
acceptance and leaving admissibility solely in hands of scientific community).
21. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (providing no authority for conclusions). The
court cited no authority in the opinion, implying that the court was unaware of the
widespread implications from the decision. See Alma Kelley McLeod, Comment, Is
Frye Dying or Is Daubert Doomed? Determining the Standard of Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence in Alabama Courts, 51 AtA. L. REV. 883, 884 (2000) (discussing holding and
impact of Frye opinion). Moreover, the court refrained from defining what consti-
tutes novel scientific evidence, thereby leaving unanswered. the vital question of
what evidence triggers the standard. See id. at 885. The court merely held that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
22. See Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1.2.3, at 5-7 (1997) (stating that no
resistance to Frye appeared in scholarly works or judicial discourse until 1970s); see
2001] NOTE
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unquestioned application of the standard began crumbling fifty years later
when Congress adopted a general evidentiary framework binding on fed-
eral courts. 23
2. Relevance Standard
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence to govern
the admissibility of evidence. 24 The basis for admitting exert testimony is
set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("FRE 702"), which requires the
trial judge to ascertain whether the witness qualifies as an expert and
whether the witness will testify to matters that are related to the issue in
question and that are outside the ken of the average jury.25 Because FRE
702 makes no reference to the general acceptance standard, either in the
text of the rule or its commentary, confusion arose regarding the contin-
ued application of Fye.26
3. Reliability Standard
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,2 7 the United States Supreme
Court settled whether the general acceptance standard or FRE 702 gov-
erns the admissibility of expert testimony. 28 In Daubert, the Court held
that FRE 702 superseded the general acceptance standard as the absolute
evidentiary test for admissibility. 29 The Court emphasized, however, that
alsoJoseph G. Feehan, Life After Daubert and Kumho Tire: An Update on Admissibil-
ity of Expert Testimony, 88 ILL. B.J. 134, 134 (2000) (explaining long-time applicabil-
ity of general acceptance standard in federal and state courts); Douglas R.
Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 Mo. L. REv. 485, 495-96 (1997) (same).
23. See Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-2.4, at 7-10 (examining scholarly and
judicial criticisms of Frye).
24. See id. § 1-3.0, at 10-11 (discussing development of Federal Rules of
Evidence).
25. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (setting forth rule regarding expert testimony). FRE
702 states that "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
26. See I PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 1-10, at 65-70 (3d ed. 1999) (noting division between courts treating Federal
Rules of Evidence as superseding Frye and those which continue to follow Frye be-
cause nothing in Rules or legislative history overruled Frye). Some courts inter-
preted FRE 702 as incorporating Frye while other courts focused on the omitted
reference to Frye as indication that the strict requirement of general acceptance no
longer controlled. Compare Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1110-11 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Frye), with United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting Frye as sole determinative factor in assess-
ing reliability), and State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Iowa 1980) (en banc)
(rejecting Frye in light of expert testimony rule).
27. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
28. See id. at 587 (holding that Federal Rules of Evidence supersede Frye).
29. See id. The Daubert Court based its conclusion that FRE 702 superseded
Frye on two factors illuminated through the plain language and context of the rule.
See id. at 588-89 (examining plain language and context of FRE 702). First, Con-
392 [Vol. 46: p. 385
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its decision did not completely loosen the restraints on admitting expert
testimony, nor did it relax the duties of the trial judge to screen the prof-
fered evidence. 30 The trial judge must assess whether the expert testi-
mony is relevant to the issue in question and, moreover, is reliable
(meaning that the proffered evidence must be grounded in scientific rea-
soning or methodology). 3 1 To assist the trial judge in his or her gatekeep-
ing role of evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence, the Court
outlined four non-binding factors that trial courts may consider: (1)
whether the theory or technique evinced by the expert is testable; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review; (3)
whether the theory or technique has reported or known error rates; and
(4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific
community.3 2
gress omitted any reference to the general acceptance standard, implying that the
legislature did not intend the standard to have an effect on the enacted rules. See
id. (same). Second, the legislative purpose in adopting the federal rules of evi-
dence-namely, the creation of rules with a "liberal thrust" in order to "relax[ ] the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony"-directly contradicted the conservative
approach of Frye to apply the general acceptance standard as the sole determina-
tive factor of admissibility. Id. at 588-89 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488
U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
Although the Daubert decision only binds the federal courts, the decision has
found its way into state jurisprudence with at least thirty states adopting Daubert or
employing their own version of reliability within the state evidentiary scheme. See
Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-3.0, at 11-12 n.7 (1997), 3 n.4 (Supp. 2000) (iden-
tifying states adopting reliability analysis or retaining general acceptance); 1 GiAN-
NELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 26, §§ 1-13 to 15, at 80-87 (identifying states
adopting reliability analysis or retaining general acceptance); see also Bert Black,
Expert Evidence in the Wake of the Daubert-Jones-Kumho Tire Trilogy, 1999 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 125, 171-75 (identifying states applying Daubert or
retaining Frye).
30. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (explaining impact of ruling on trial court's
duty to assess admissibility of evidence).
31. See id. at 589-92 (explaining relevancy and reliability requirements). The
Daubert decision fleshed out three prerequisites of an FRE 702 analysis. First, the
court must determine if the witness is qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education." FED. R. EVIo. 702; see also State v. Albeico, 861 P.2d 192,
202 (N.M. 1993) (identifying elements under Rule 702 analysis); Faigman et al.,
supra note 20, § 1-3.2, at 15 (explaining qualification prong). Second, under the
helpfulness or relevancy prong, the court must assess whether the testimony "will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
FED. R. EvID. 702; see also Alberico, 861 P.2d at 202 (identifying elements under Rule
702 analysis); Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-3.1, at 13-14 (explaining relevancy
prong). Third, the court must assess the validity and reliability of the proffered
evidence, both terms that are "interrelated, with the concept of validity encompass-
ing the concept of reliability." Alberico, 861 P.2d at 203 (identifying elements
under Rule 702 analysis). The Supreme Court of New Mexico also explained that
"[v]alidity is the measure of determining whether the testimony is grounded in or
a function of established scientific methods or principles, that is, scientific knowl-
edge. Reliability is akin to relevancy in considering whether the expert opinion
will assist the trier of fact." Id.
32. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (explaining four factor analysis of expert scien-
tific evidence). In applying these factors, judges need not approach the testimony
9
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Much confusion arose over the application of the Daubert decision to
technical and specialized knowledge because Daubert involved only scien-
tific testimony.3 3 The Court settled this confusion in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichae43 4 when it extended the reliability component to all expert testi-
mony.35 The Court emphasized, however, that application of the eviden-
tiary standard is flexible, meaning that the court can rely upon the four
factors outlined in Daubert as well as any other factors deemed appropriate
in the particular circumstances.
36
with the goal of establishing "a categorical view of the science. Judges are ex-
pected to use the Daubert factors (and others) to determine if it is more likely than
not that the methods and reasoning validly support the proffered scientific expert
testimony." Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-3.3, at 19 (explaining validity prong).
33. See Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-3.4, at 30 (explaining confusion aris-
ing after Daubert decision); Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evi-
dence: The Fallout from Supreme Court's Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRM. JUST. 12,
14-15 (2000) (explaining different approaches by courts to technical knowledge
following Daubert).
The United States Supreme Court also never addressed the standard of review
applicable to evidentiary rulings based on a Daubert analysis. See Faigman et al.,
supra note 20, § 1-3.5, at 37-38 (explaining confusion regarding standard of re-
view). Some courts accorded greater deference to the trial court by applying an
abuse of discretion standard; other courts limited discretion by applying a de novo
standard of review to evidentiary rulings. Compare Duffee v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,
91 F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying abuse of discretion to evidentiary
rulings on expert testimony), with Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th
Cir. 1996) (applying plenary review to evidentiary rulings on expert testimony),
rev'd, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). The Court concluded that an abuse of discretion
applies to reviews of Daubert decisions. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
143 (1997) (holding that appellate courts hearing challenges to Daubert rulings
must "give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion
review").
34. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
35. See id. at 149 (holding that reliability and relevancy standard applies to all
expert testimony). In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the federal
rules grant "all experts, not just . .. 'scientific ones,"' greater "latitude" to testify
regarding their opinions compared to laypersons. See id. at 148 (explaining why
distinction between types of expert testimony is inappropriate). Additionally, the
Court said no clear distinction between scientific, technical or specialized knowl-
edge exists or is necessary given that all three exact the same "foreign experience"
upon the jury. See id. at 149 (same).
36. See id. at 149-53 (explaining discretion granted to trial judge in assessing
reliability and relevance of expert testimony). The proposed amendment to FRE
702 codifies the holdings in Daubert and Kumho by emphasizing the judge's
gatekeeping role, clarifying the standards for assessing reliability and explaining
that the rule applies to all types of evidence. See H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at 40-41
(2000) (explaining rationale for amending FRE 702); see also Giannelli & Im-
winkelried, supra note 33, at 13 (noting that proposed amendment to FRE 702
applies to all evidence and takes effect as of December 1, 2000, unless Congress
intervenes). The amendment alters FRE 702 by including the following language
at the end of the existing rule: "if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case." H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at 40.
[Vol. 46: p. 385
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B. Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Repressed Memories in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases
As a result of the growing trend to extend the discovery rule to re-
pressed child sexual abuse cases and increased reliance by adult victims of
child abuse on expert testimony on the repressed memory phenomenon,
many courts are facing evidentiary challenges to the use of such testi-
mony.37 Although the scientific community remains divided on the relia-
bility of repressed memories, and the empirical data supporting and
disconfirming the phenomenon remains the same, courts addressing the
evidentiary admissibility of repressed memory testimony have reached con-
tradictory outcomes.38
1. Successful Challenges to Expert Testimony on Repressed Memories
In State v. Hungeford,39 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
deemed expert testimony on repressed memories inadmissible on reliabil-
ity grounds.40 In Hungerford, the court reasoned that a reliability standard
applied to expert testimony on repressed memories because repressed
memories evoked from therapeutic techniques are inseparable from the
process triggering the recall.4 1 In a detailed analysis employed by New
Hampshire's court of last resort, the expert testimony failed to pass relia-
bility scrutiny because of the "divisive state of the scientific debate" con-
cerning the accuracy of memories recovered "either spontaneously or by
some method seeking to recover the memory."4 2
37. See Faigman et al., supra note 9, § 13-1.1, at 528-29 (discussing when in
legal process expert testimony on repressed memories is relevant); see also Richard-
son, supra note 5, at 529 (explaining that Daubert is second "hurdle" child abuse
plaintiff must overcome). This Note will focus solely on cases involving repressed
memories recovered spontaneously or through the aid of therapeutic techniques.
For a discussion of hypnotically refreshed memories and the evidentiary ap-
proaches that states undertake with such testimony, see generally MatthewJ. Eisen-
berg, Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility
Question, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 249 (1995) and Emily E. Smith-Lee, Note, Recovered
Memories of Childhood Abuse: Should Long-Buried Memories Be Admissible Testimony, 37
B.C. L. REv. 591 (1996).
38. See Robert Timothy Reagan, Scientific Consensus on Memory Repression and
Recovery, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 277-81 (1999) (giving overview of cases dealing
with evidentiary admissibility of repressed memory testimony).
39. 697 A.2d 916 (N.H. 1997).
40. See id. at 930 (applying Daubert-plus analysis and holding that "phenome-
non of recovery of repressed memories has not yet reached the point where [the
court] may perceive these particular recovered memories as reliable"). In Hunger-
ford, the court consolidated two criminal cases in which the defendants were ac-
cused of sexually abusing victims, who were minors at the time of the alleged
events, but had repressed the memories and years later recalled the alleged events
in therapy. See id. at 917-19.
41. See id. at 921 (affirming trial court's conclusion that recollection of re-
pressed memories during therapy is inseparable from therapeutic process utilized
to retrieve memories).
42. Id. at 921. In reaching its decision, the Hungerford court stated that the
party proffering the expert testimony must demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood
2001] NOTE
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire faced another case involving
expert testimony on repressed memories in State v. Walters.43 In Walters,
the court relied on its holding in Hungerford to find that the repressed
memory phenomenon failed a Daubert analysis. 44 Similarly, in State v.
Quattrocchi,45 the Superior Court of Rhode Island excluded expert testi-
mony on repressed memories after applying the Daubert factors.46 Because
that the recovered memory is as accurate as ordinary human memory" to satisfy the
reliability showing. Id. at 924. To assess the admissibility of the proffered evi-
dence, the court employed a multi-factor analysis that incorporated the first four
factors outlined in Daubert. See id. at 925 (outlining eight factor test). Additionally,
the court was cognizant of the impact of suggestibility techniques on recovered
memories and, therefore, incorporated four factors to assess the corroborative na-
ture of the memories: (1) the age of the victim-witness at the time of the alleged
abuse; (2) length of delay between alleged abuse and recovery of memories; (3)
"objective, verifiable corroborative evidence" that the alleged abuse occurred; and
(4) circumstances giving rise to the recovery, including use of therapeutic or other
recovery techniques. See id. (outlining eight-factor test).
Based on a review of the empirical literature, the court concluded that, de-
spite the growing discourse and research on repressed memories in peer-reviewed
publications, the recovered memory phenomenon lacked general acceptance be-
cause of the divisive split in the scientific community. See id. at 927-28. The court
then recognized that, although testing of repressed memories is difficult, some
studies indicate that testing is nonetheless possible. See id. at 928. No false positive
rates are plausible, however, because no effective method to trace false memories
exists. See id. (noting particular problem with testing). Moreover, the age of the
victims at the time of the abuse (early twenties and thirteen years of age) and the
short time delay between the alleged abuse and recovery of the memories (one
and a half years and four years) favored the reliability of the recovered memories.
See id. at 928-29 (applying last four factors in reliability test). Nevertheless, the
court noted that no "indicia of reliability [was] present in the particular memories"
presented by the plaintiffs because no corroborative evidence existed and the
memories were recovered during therapy. See id. at 930 (holding that reliability of
recovered memories could not outweigh lack of general acceptance for repressed
memories).
43. 698 A.2d 1244 (N.H. 1997). In Walters, the defendant allegedly sexually
assaulted his stepdaughter when she was nine or ten years old. See id. at 1245. The
stepdaughter allegedly repressed the memories until she was fifteen when she
started to have nightmares that included flashbacks of the abuse. See id. at 1245.
The trial court permitted expert testimony only to explain "the phenomena of
traumatic amnesia and memory repression, and to opine on the reliability of ordi-
nary memory and recovered memory ...... Id. at 1246.
44. See id. at 124748 (applying four factors to assess indicia of reliability of
particular memories at issue). In holding that no sufficient indicia of reliability
existed for the complainant's recovered memories, the court emphasized the com-
plainant's young age at the time of the alleged abuse, the time delay of eight years
before the complainant recalled the abuse, and the lack of corroborative evidence.
See id. at 124748 (applying Hungerford indicia of reliability factors to case and ex-
cluding testimony). Additionally, the court held that the party proffering the ex-
pert testimony bears the burden to establish the validity of the repressed
memories. See id. at 1246 (holding that trial court erroneously shifted burden to
defending party to prove unreliability of repressed memories).
45. No. P92-3759, 1999 WL 284882, at *1 (R.I. Apr. 26, 1999).
46. See id. at *6, *16 (explaining standard to apply to evidence and deciding
to exclude evidence). The lower court admitted expert testimony on repressed
memories without holding a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss2/2
Rhode Island still retained Frye, the court focused closely on the general
acceptance factor.4 7 In reaching its decision to exclude the testimony, the
court adopted the reasoning of the Hungerford court, which emphasized
the lack of consensus in the scientific field regarding the validity of re-
pressed memories.
48
Finally, in Franklin v. Stevenson,49 the Supreme Court of Utah also ex-
cluded expert testimony on repressed memories under a reliability analy-
sis. 50  In holding that the trial court failed its gatekeeping role by
admitting the testimony, the court emphasized that the plaintiff's experts
conceded that no scientific validity existed for the recovery techniques
used to elicit the plaintiffs memories. 51 Furthermore, the court con-
ducted its own independent research that revealed no scientific support
validating the theory of repression.5 2
testimony. See State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 881 (R.I. 1996) (explaining pro-
cedural history of case). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the de-
fendant's conviction and remanded the case for the lower court to conduct a
preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence under a Daubert analy-
sis. See id. at 884 (concluding that Rhode Island justices must exercise "gatekeep-
ing function . . . prior to allowing scientific evidence that supports repressed
recollections or flashbacks to be submitted to the jury, if such evidence is chal-
lenged by an appropriate objection or motion to suppress").
47. See Hungerford, 1999 WL 284882, at *6-9 (explaining importance of gen-
eral acceptance standard to case). The court concluded that scientific evidence
must satisfy both the Daubert factors and the general acceptance standard because
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided in an earlier case that the state rules
of evidence failed to supercede the Frye rule. See id. (noting Rhode Island's contin-
ued adherence to Frye). The court went on to state, however, that Frye and the
general acceptance factor in Daubert require an equivalent analysis. See id. at *11
(explaining similarity of standards).
48. See id. at *13-14 (noting reason why repressed recollection is unreliable).
The court found the expert testimony unreliable and therefore inadmissible be-
cause of the lack of consensus on the "accuracy and authenticity of repressed recol-
lection." Id. at *14. The court also rejected an argument by the State to relax the
test as applied to "soft sciences" because ethical concerns make testing in this area
difficult, if not impossible. See id. The court emphasized that, even in cases that
make a "soft science" argument, reliability remains an essential requirement. See
id. (citing United States v. Hal4 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (C.D. Ill. 1997)).
49. 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999).
50. See id. at 28 (rendering holding of case). The plaintiff had recovered
memories of abuse through the aid of therapeutic techniques, including relaxa-
tion techniques. See id. at 23. The defendant challenged the admissibility of testi-
mony on the theory of repression and the therapeutic techniques on reliability
grounds. See id. In reaching its decision to exclude the testimony, the court ex-
plained that Utah case law required the party proffering the evidence to demon-
strate the reliability of the underlying principles or techniques. See id. at 26-27. To
guide the analysis, the court highlighted Daubertlike factors as essential factors. See
id. at 27 (holding that Daubert-like factors are "instructive in trial court-level inquir-
ies into the reliability of scientific evidence").
51. See id. at 27-28 (reproducing portion of experts' testimony from which
court concluded that "[n]either expert could assure the trial court that the thera-
peutic methods at issue had any degree of scientific validity or reliability").
52. See id. at 28 n.3 (explaining results of independent research on repres-
sion). The court concluded that, because the techniques employed lacked reliabil-
20011 NOTE 397
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2. Unsuccessful Challenges to Expert Testimony on Repressed Memories
In Isely v. Capuchin Province,53 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan admitted repressed memory testimony under
a Daubert-like analysis.5 4 In Isely, the court held that expert testimony on
repressed memories and post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") was ad-
missible because "sufficient scientific basis of support for the theory [ex-
ists] in [the psychology expert's] field of expertise." 55 The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts relied on Isely in Shahzade v.
Gregoy 6 and admitted expert testimony on repressed memories after find-
ing that the expert proffered sufficient scientific evidence to satisfy the
four-factor Daubert analysis. 57
Prior to the Logerquist decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, only
one state court rendered expert testimony on repressed memories admis-
sible. 58 In Wilson v. Phillips,59 the California Court of Appeals admitted
the testimony after holding that the lower court erroneously applied the
general acceptance standard. 60 In reaching its conclusion that expert tes-
timony on repressed memories was subject to a relevancy standard, the
Wilson court analogized the conclusions of the expert to a medical ex-
ity, "any expert testimony based upon [these] techniques is also unreliable and
inadmissible." Id. at 28.
53. 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
54. See id. at 1064-67 (applying Daubert-like factors to proffered testimony).
55. Id. at 1066. The expert testified that several studies on repressed memo-
ries appeared in the literature and focused heavily on two survey studies. See id. at
1065 (explaining expert's testimony and reliance on studies). Additionally, the
expert opined that a majority of clinicians recognized the concept of repression,
producing a fair degree of acceptance among this group. See id. The expert
noted, however, that scientific acceptance was not universal as no consensus exists
on the accuracy of elicited memories. See id.
56. 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996).
57. See id. at 288-90 (applying Daubert and holding testimony admissible). The
expert testified that several published studies supported the theory of repression
and that most clinicians recognize the theory. See id. at 288. In addition to the
expert testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the court also relied on the
APA's inclusion of dissociative amnesia within its diagnostic nomenclature. See id.
at 289.
58. See Wilson v. Phillips, 73 Cal. App. 4th 250, 256 (1999) (affirming admissi-
bility of repressed memory evidence).
59. 73 Cal. App. 4th 250 (1999).
60. See id. at 255-56 (concluding that general acceptance standard was inappli-
cable to particular expert testimony in this case). In Wilson, the plaintiffs, the
daughter and stepdaughter of the defendant, filed a civil suit against the defen-
dant for molesting them when they were younger. See id. at 252. Both victims
repressed memories of the abuse for over thirteen years. See id. at 252-53. The
plaintiffs offered into evidence expert testimony on repressed memories and ex-
pert testimony that they exhibited symptoms consistent with individuals who had
repressed memories of abuse. See id. The expert also testified that studies demon-
strated that children will repress memories of abuse, thereby triggering dissociative
amnesia. See id. at 253 n.2. The children later recalled the memories due to a
triggering event or circumstance. See id. The expert further opined that repressed
memories are "as accurate as" unrepressed memories. See id.
398 [Vol. 46: p. 385
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pert.6 1 The court found no difference between a psychological evaluation
of. a child sexual abuse victim to assess mental condition and a medical
evaluation of a person for physical ailments. 62 The court concluded that
the expert testimony proffered in Wilson "amounted to little more than
run-of-the-mill expert medical opinion," which California law categorically
exempts from a Frye analysis. 63 Consequently, not only is Wilson the only
state case that admits repressed memory testimony, it is also the only case
that applies a low-level evidentiary standard.
64
61. See id. at 255 (comparing psychological expert testimony on repressed
memories to medical expert testimony).
62. See id. (finding comparability between psychological expert testimony on
repressed memories and medical expert testimony).
63. Id. at 255. When Frye is inapplicable, California courts analyze admissibil-
ity under the state evidence code. See id. at 257 (Crosby, J., concurring) (stating
that case involved "an evidentiary issue for the judge and jury to deal with under
existing rules"). Included within the code is an expert testimony rule that incorpo-
rates language similar to FRE 702. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2000) (requir-
ing that expert and other opinion testimony be "related to a subject that is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist
the trier of fact").
Similar to California, Florida retains Fyeas the evidentiary standard for admit-
ting expert testimony, although it also adopted an expert testimony rule modeled
on FRE 702. See Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-78 (Fla. 1997) (explaining
Florida's adherence to Frye despite adoption of state rules of evidence); see also
Holdsworth, supra note 7, at 124 (examining Florida's approach to expert testi-
mony); Steele, supra note 8, at 968-69 (same). Florida also permits expert testi-
mony under a relevancy standard by making a distinction between "expertise that
is based solely upon the experience of the expert and expertise that is based upon
experience as well as knowledge of clinical studies performed by third parties."
Steele, supra note 8, at 968. For instance, in Flanagan v. State, the Supreme Court
of Florida rendered profile testimony inadmissible under Frye because Florida law
finds "profile and syndrome evidence" unreliable. See 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993) (applying Frye to exclude sex offender testimony). Opinions based solely on
experience and training, however, need only satisfy relevancy analysis. See id. at
828 (explaining distinction between pure opinion testimony and scientific-expert
testimony). In Hadden, the court applied this distinction to expert testimony on
behavioral characteristics of a child victim of sexual abuse. See Hadden, 690 So. 2d
at 581 (applying distinction to proffered testimony). The court concluded that the
proffered testimony must pass Frye analysis because the expert based his opinions
on diagnostic criteria. See id. at 580-81 (holding that testimony was inadmissible
because it constituted profile evidence and thereby lacked reliability). The court
noted that such testimony "is not made admissible by combining [it] with pure
opinion testimony because such a combination is not pure opinion evidence based
solely upon the expert's clinical experience." Id. at 580.
64. But see Commonwealth v. Crawford, 718 A.2d 768, 773 (Pa. 1998) (refus-
ing to permit repressed memory testimony in criminal case unrelated to childhood
sexual abuse). In Crawford, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that expert
testimony on repressed memories was inadmissible because the testimony would
address the issue of credibility, which falls within the ken of the jury. See id. (ex-
plaining reasoning for excluding expert testimony in criminal case not involving
childhood sexual abuse). The court emphasized, however, that the scientific valid-
ity of repressed memories was not at issue in this case because the government had
not introduced evidence to support the credibility of the witness' assertion that he
had repressed the memory. See id. Therefore, unlike Wilson, this case bears no
weight on which evidentiary standard applies to repressed memory testimony. See
15
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C. Evidentiay Challenges to Expert Testimony in Arizona
1. Application of Evidentiary Standards in Arizona
Since 1962, Arizona has applied Frye as its evidentiary standard,
thereby requiring that expert scientific testimony meet the general accept-
ance standard.6 5 In 1997, Arizona enacted its own rules of evidence,
modeled extensively on the Federal Rules of Evidence. 66 Included within
the state rules is Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 ("ARE 702"), an expert
testimony rule that mirrors the language of FRE 702.67 Nevertheless, Ari-
zona courts continued to apply Frye to expert testimony after adopting the
Arizona Rules of Evidence. 68 The Supreme Court of Arizona made an
exception to this rule in criminal cases in which experts proffered testi-
mony based on their experiences, observations, training and education. 69
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Arizona permitted testimony on gen-
eral behavioral characteristics of child victims of sexual abuse and rape
victims, while simultaneously excluding on Frye grounds expert testimony
on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome ("CSAAS") and rape
trauma syndrome ("RTS").7° In none of these cases did the court address
the impact of Daubert on ARE 702, and, in fact, the court refrained from
doing so in cases where the issue was placed squarely before it.71
id. at 773 n.2 (stating that decision does not address whether repressed memory
testimony is admissible under Frye).
65. See State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 898 (Ariz. 1962) (en banc) (refusing to
admit testimony on lie detector test because of lack of general acceptance for test);
see also Paul F. Eckstein & Samuel A. Thumma, Novel Scientific Expert Evidence in
Arizona State Courts, Amiz. Arr'v, June 1998, at 18 (explaining evolution of general
acceptance standard in Arizona).
66. See Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 125 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (explain-
ing that Arizona adopted its own version of Federal Rules of Evidence in 1977).
67. See ARIz. R. EVW. 702 (providing comparable rule to FRE 702 for admit-
ting expert testimony).
68. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (emphasiz-
ing reliance on Frye in DNA evidence context); State v. Velasco, 799 P.2d 821, 827
(Ariz. 1990) (en banc) (applying Frye to silica gel tests); State ex rel. Collins v. Sei-
del, 691 P.2d 678, 681 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (explaining that ARE 702 requires
showing of general acceptance).
69. See State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (permit-
ting opinion testimony based on experience and observations with DNA testing);
State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) (permitting opinion
testimony based on experience and observations with child incest victims); State v.
Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1319-20 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (permitting opinion testi-
mony based on experience and observations with dog scent tracking).
70. See State v. Huey, 699 P.2d 1290, 1293-94 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (permit-
ting expert testimony in rape case); State v. Varela, 873 P.2d 657, 664 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993) (permitting expert testimony in child sexual abuse case). For an over-
view of RTS, see Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics?" Psycho-
logical Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753, 761 (1996).
For an overview of CSAAS, see Steele, supra note 8, at 943-44.
71. See Bible, 858 P.2d at 1183 (emphasizing reliance on Frye and declining to
adopt Daubert in this case); see also Eckstein & Thumma, supra note 65, at 19 (ex-
plaining that Arizona has not adopted Daubert). In Bible, the court addressed
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2. Evidentiary Challenges to Repressed Memory Testimony in Arizona
Prior to Logerquist, the Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed only one
case, Doe v. Roe,72 in which repressed memory was central to the claim.
73
In Doe, the court removed the initial barrier to repressed child sexual
abuse cases and allowed victims to file claims after reaching the age of
majority.7 4 In reaching this decision, the court analyzed at some length
the current scientific status of the repressed memory phenomenon and
determined that "repressed memories of childhood abuse can exist and
can be triggered and recovered." 75 The court noted that the accuracy of
these recollections is nonetheless suspect because suggestible therapeutic
techniques or inadequately skilled therapists may falsely implant the mem-
ories. 76 The court emphasized that its analysis did not reach so far as to
decide the admissibility of expert testimony on repressed memory.77 Con-
sequently, the Supreme Court of Arizona left unanswered how Arizona law
would approach expert testimony on repressed memories, and thereby set
the stage to assess this issue in Logerquist.
whether expert testimony on DNA testing is admissible if the experts based their
opinions on statistical calculations that lack general acceptance. See Bible, 858 P.2d
at 1187 (disfavoring government's arguments on admissibility of testimony). The
court held that such statistical calculations were subject to Frye analysis and could
not pass muster. See id. at 1188-89 (explaining that DNA statistics at issue lacked
general acceptance in scientific community and could not satisfy Frye require-
ment). The court also refused to analyze the effect of Daubert on the general ac-
ceptance standard in the context of DNA testing. See id. at 1183. Specifically, the
court recognized that:
[DNA testing] makes line-drawing in this case particularly difficult. Not
only are we in a complex scientific field, but the technology is still evolv-
ing. Furthermore, this is not an area in which the jury can easily pene-
trate the aura of infallibility, nor one in which the principles are easily
demonstrable in the courtroom.
Id. at 1183.
Additionally, the court noted that DNA testing has generated substantial con-
troversy and falls within a complex field that is still evolving. See id. The court also
refrained from addressing the effect of Daubert on ARE 702 because the parties did
not extensively brief the issue. See id.
72. 955 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc).
73. See id. at 954-56.
74. See id. at 969 (extending discovery rule and Arizona statute tolling statute
of limitations for unsound mind to repressed memory cases). The Supreme Court
of Arizona disagreed with the lower court's decision to weigh the facts and ascer-
tain whether the specific case fell within the parameters of the discovery rule and
the statutory analysis for unsound mind. See id. at 969. Instead, the court held that
the jury shoulders this responsibility. See id. at 969.
75. Id. at 959.
76. See id. (rendering conclusion that memories can be inaccurate or im-
planted based on review of debate surrounding repressed memory).
77. See id. at 956 (noting that evidentiary question of application of Frye is not
at issue).
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III. FACTS: LOGERQUIST V. McVEY
At the age of thirty, Kim E. Logerquist claimed that her pediatrician,
John T. Danforth, sexually molested her during four visits between 1971
and 1973.78 At the time of the alleged offense, Logerquist was eight to ten
years old.7 9 From 1973 to 1991, Logerquist claimed that she uncon-
sciously repressed memories of the sexual molestation to maintain emo-
tional stability.8 0 Her memory loss ended in September 1991, when she
began having flashbacks of the abuse.8 ' Logerquist claimed that her recall
of the sexual molestation returned spontaneously after viewing a commer-
cial featuring a pediatrician.
8 2
In September 1992, Logerquist filed suit against Danforth asserting
several claims, including intentional torts, medical malpractice and breach
of fiduciary duty.8 3 Danforth filed a motion for summary judgment assert-
ing that Logerquist filed her claims after the statute of limitations pe-
riod. 84 The trial judge granted Danforth's motion, holding that
78. See Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 115 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (giving
facts of case); see also Logerquist v. Danforth, 932 P.2d 281, 282 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996) (explaining facts of case on appeal from trial court's ruling that plaintiffs
claims were time-barred).
79. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 115.
80. See Logerquist, 932 P.2d at 282.
81. See id. Logerquist's flashbacks unveiled three memories. See id. at 282-83.
In the first memory, Logerquist recalled "Danforth touching her inappropriately
between the legs and inserting something cold into her vagina." Id. at 283. In the
second memory, Logerquist remembered Danforth inserting an object into her
vagina and rectum and "threatening to give her a big shot if she [did] not stop
fussing." Id. In the third memory, Logerquist recalled "moving backwards on the
table, feeling something inserted in her rectum and vagina, and being pulled
down onto the table." Id.
82. See id. at 282. Some discrepancy existed regarding what triggered Loger-
quist's memories. See id. According to Logerquist's deposition, an old movie trig-
gered her flashbacks. See id. Yet, she informed two friends that a television
commercial for children's medicine and featuring a pediatrician triggered her
memories. See id.
83. See id. at 283. It is unclear from the facts of the case whether Logerquist's
memories were enhanced or refreshed through therapy during the one-year delay
between her recall of the abuse and her subsequent filing of the claim. See id. at
282-83 (omitting any reference to plaintiffs actions between September 1991 and
September 1992). Logerquist was seeing a physician and psychologist for "emo-
tional problems" at the time the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled on the admissi-
bility of her proffered expert testimony on repressed memories. See Logerquist, 1
P.3d at 116 (noting that defendant argued that plaintiffs memories "had been
distorted, implanted, or suggested by improper techniques" used by professionals
plaintiff sought for treatment). The nature of the professional contact was un-
known from the facts. See id. at 115-116 (explaining facts and procedural history of
case with no reference to nature of professional treatment sought by plaintiff).
84. See Logerquist, 932 P.2d at 283. In addition to arguing that summary judg-
ment was proper because Logerquist's claims were time-barred, the defendant also
claimed that repressed memory testimony was inadmissible under Fye. See id. at
288 (noting plaintiff's contention regarding expert testimony on repressed
memories).
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Logerquist's claims were time-barred. 85 Logerquist successfully appealed
the Arizona trial court's decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
86
Logerquist then sought to introduce expert testimony on the phe-
nomenon of repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. 87 Danforth
filed a motion objecting to this testimony and requesting the trial court
hold a Frye hearing to assess the admissibility of testimony on repressed
memories. 88 Over Logerquist's objection, the trial court granted Dan-
forth's motion for a hearing.89 At the hearing two experts testified: a
clinical psychiatrist for the plaintiff and a research psychologist for the
defendant.90 Plaintiffs expert explained that at trial he would testify that,
based on his experience, observation of patients and the repressed mem-
ory literature, he believed the phenomenon exists for some persons.
9 1
Specifically, the plaintiffs expert would testify that "severe childhood
trauma, including sexual abuse, can cause a repression of memory, and
that in later years this memory can be recalled with accuracy."92 Defen-
dant's expert explained that at trial he would testify regarding the meth-
odological flaws in the published studies on repressed memories.
93
85. See id. at 283 (discussing holding of trial court).
86. See id. at 285-86 (explaining that common law delays statute of limitations
in repressed child sexual abuse cases and remanding case for trial).
87. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 116 (giving procedural history of case).
88. See id. (explaining procedural history of case). Both parties engaged in
intensive motion practice after filing motions supporting and disfavoring a Frye
hearing. See id. at 117 (stating that "veritable blizzard of paper" proceeded initial
filings supporting and disfavoring Frye hearing). In separate filings, Danforth
sought to limit the testimony of plaintiff's expert regarding animal studies, his tes-
timony based on his clinical experience and his testimony concerning the reports
documenting the occurrence of repressed memory. See id. (noting scope of defen-
dant's motion practice). Additionally, Danforth filed a separate motion requesting
the court to perform three acts: (1) preclude Logerquist's treating physician and
therapist from testifying; (2) permit Danforth to provide additional information to
assist the court in assessing the proffered testimony by plaintiffs expert; and (3)
"strike an affidavit filed in opposition to [Danforth's] motion for summary judg-
ment because it contained expert opinion." Id.
89. See id. at 115.
90. See id. (noting qualifications of experts). Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr.
Bessel A. van der Kolk, specialized in dissociative disorder, treated patients suffer-
ing from repressed memory, and conducted research on memory and trauma. See
id. at 115, 117 (explaining background of plaintiff's expert). Defendant's expert
witness, Dr. Richard Kihlstrom, lacked any clinical experience with persons claim-
ing to suffer from repressed memory and conducted no studies regarding memory
and trauma. See id. at 115 (giving background of defendant's expert).
91. See id. at 115 (discussing testimony of plaintiff's expert). Dr. van der Kolk
also submitted a letter to plaintiffs counsel accepting plaintiffs request for his
testimony. See id. at 117 (reproducing portion of letter). In that letter, Dr. van der
Kolk explained that he would rely on published studies documenting repressed
memory, the presence of dissociative amnesia within APA's diagnostic nomencla-
ture and the "official statement of the [APA] on Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse." Id.
92. Id. at 115 (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, No. CV 92-16309 (Ariz. Super.
Ct. June 11, 1998) (order excluding expert testimony on repressed memories)).
93. See id. at 115 (explaining testimony of defendant's expert).
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Additionally, the witness cited several studies demonstrating that trauma
improves memory, rather than represses it.94 The trial judge concluded
that the testimony of plaintiff's witness was not based on generally ac-
cepted theories and, therefore, was inadmissible under Frye.95
Logerquist sought review of the trial court's interlocutory order by
the court of appeals, but was unsuccessful. 96 Following the court of ap-
peals' refusal to grant jurisdiction, Logerquist then sought review by the
Supreme Court of Arizona.9 7 The Supreme Court of Arizona accepted
review and concluded that the testimony of plaintiff's expert was not sub-
ject to a Frye analysis and ARE 702 did not incorporate the reliability stan-
dard promulgated in Daubert.98
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In determining that Frye was inapplicable to expert testimony on re-
pressed memories, the Supreme Court of Arizona relied heavily upon Ari-
zona criminal case law applying Frye and the decisions of other
jurisdictions.99 Because the court concluded that expert testimony on re-
94. See id. (explaining testimony of defendant's expert).
95. See id. at 118 (giving trial court's rationale for excluding testimony prof-
fered by plaintiff's expert) (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, No. CV 92-16309 (Ariz.
Super. Ct. June 11, 1998) (order excluding expert testimony on repressed memo-
ries)). In reaching its conclusion that the "theories advanced by Plaintiff's experts
are not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community of trauma memory
researchers," the Superior Court focused on the "infancy" of studies regarding the
effects of trauma on memory and the "methodological flaws" in published studies
on this issue. Id. (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, No. CV 92-16309 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 11, 1998) (order excluding expert testimony on repressed memories)). The
court further identified methodological flaws in the studies relied upon by Dr. van
der Kolk: "These methodological flaws include, but are not limited to, inadequate
sample sizes, gender bias, [lack of] consideration of other reasons for loss of mem-
ory (i.e. infantile amnesia), and perhaps most importantly, [lack of] independent
corroboration that the event alleged to have been forgotten, actually occurred."
Id. (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, No. CV 92-16309 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 11,
1998) (order excluding expert testimony on repressed memories)).
96. See id. at 115 (explaining procedural history of case). Decisions rendered
at evidentiary hearings constitute interlocutory orders that Arizona law renders
appealable at the discretion of the appellate court. See ARuz. R. PRO. SPECIAL Ac-
TION 1 (allowing discretionary review of interlocutory orders).
97. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 115 (describing procedural history of case).
98. See id. (explaining holding in case).
99. See id. at 119-23 (giving rationale for rejecting Frye and applying ARE 702
to repressed memory). Prior to addressing the applicability of the general accept-
ance standard, the court first outlined the contentions of the parties. See id. at 115.
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the Frye test was inapplicable to the expert's
testimony, or, if Frye applied, that the court should replace Frye with Daubert. See id.
In contrast, the defendant asserted that the trial judge accurately applied Frye to
the expert's testimony and deduced that repressed memory has not gained accept-
ance in the relevant scientific community. See id. The defendant also proffered an
alternative argument that if the court refused to apply or discarded the Frye stan-
dard, then Daubert applied and supported the trial court's exclusion of the testi-
mony. See id.
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pressed memories is subject to the relevancy standard outlined in ARE
702, the court next determined whether to adopt the interpretation of
FRE 702 rendered by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert and
Kumho. 0 0 The court refused to read reliability into ARE 702 based on the
text of the rule, cases decided after the adoption of ARE 702, and general
adverse impressions of the Daubert/Kumho analysis.' 0'
A. The Logerquist Court Rejects the General Acceptance Standard and
Applies ARE 702
Justice Feldman, writing for the majority, first emphasized that the
language of Frye limits its use to "novel scientific theories or processes." 10 2
Because Logerquist did not argue that a "scientific principle or process
can be used to produce memories that are always or often accurate," the
expert testimony never triggered the general acceptance requirement.1
0 3
Rather, ARE 702 would permit the plaintiff to present expert testimony to
"explain her behavior following the [alleged offense] and to help the jury
determine" the credibility and accuracy of the plaintiff's memories.
10 4
To support its conclusion that ARE 702 applied to the expert testi-
mony, the court first relied on Arizona criminal case law involving expert
testimony on behavioral characteristics of child incest victims, dog track-
ing evidence and DNA testing. 10 5 Next, the court found persuasive its de-
cisions to allow expert testimony on syndrome evidence. 10 6 Finally, the
Next, the court reviewed how the question of admissibility arose in the lower
court, as well as the reasoning behind the court's decision to preclude. See id. The
court concluded that the trial court order effectively eliminated plaintiffs ability to
bring forth repressed memory testimony from the expert, as well as her physician
and therapist. See id. at 118. Specifically, the court found that the order rendered
it difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to prove to the jury that she had
suffered from dissociative amnesia and that her recall could have been accurate.
See id. (finding that trial court order excluding testimony was too broad). The
court then presumed that, because the order applied only to the plaintiffs witness,
the defendant would be permitted to call expert witnesses to testify that the plain-
tiff's recall lacked credibility. See id.
100. See id. at 123-25 (stating that trial court erroneously applied Frye instead
of ARE 702 and that court must address effect of Daubert on ARE 702).
101. See id. at 128-32 (listing reasons for refusing to interpret a reliability com-
ponent into ARE 702).
102. Id. at 118. Logerquist is an en banc decision with four separate opinions:
(1) a majority opinion written by Justice Stanley G. Feldman; (2) a concurring
opinion written by Vice Chief Justice Charles E. Jones and joined by Chief Justice
Thomas A. Zlaket; (3) a dissenting opinion written byJustice FrederickJ. Martone;
and (4) a dissenting opinion written by Justice Ruth V. McGregor. See id. at 113-
114, 134, 136, 140.
103. Id. at 118.
104. Id. at 119.
105. See id. at 119-21 (providing overview of case law deemed applicable to
analysis).
106. See id. at 121-22 (same).
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court looked to other jurisdictions for cases analogous to the present
case. 107
1. The Court Relies on Three Arizona Criminal Cases Involving Expert
Opinion Testimony
The court first applied its holding in State v. Lindsey,10 8 a case involv-
ing child incest.1 0 9 In Lindsey, the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the
court of appeals' decision to permit testimony that child incest victims
often recant accusations of abuse under ARE 702.110 The Logerquist court
concluded that the testimony of Logerquist's expert, like the expert testi-
mony in Lindsey, "is similarly based on principles of social and behavioral
science recognized by clinicians." '11
The court then highlighted its decision in State v. Roscoe,1 12 in which
the court refused to apply Frye to dog tracking evidence. 113 The Roscoe
court reasoned that Fryewas inapplicable to the proffered expert testimony
because the testimony was not "bottomed on any scientific theory."114 Af-
ter quoting the Roscoe opinion, the Logerquist court noted that the expert
testimony admitted by the Roscoe court was subsequently rendered inva-
lid. 115 Nevertheless, the Logerquist court maintained that Roscoe was a
prime example of the infallibility of any evidentiary scheme.' 1 6
107. See id. at 122-23 (same).
108. 720 P.2d 73 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) [hereinafter Lindsey I1].
109. See id. at 74 (explaining that jury found defendant guilty of incest and
sexual exploitation of minor).
110. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 119 (stating that trial judge in Lindsey Idid not
hold Frye hearing). In Lindsey I, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the trialjudge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the proffered testimony because
the testimony did not address the credibility, of the witness and, therefore, would
not invade the province of the jury. See State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985) [hereinafter Lindsey 1]. Because the expert was qualified to testify and
the testimony was outside the ken of the average jury, the Lindsey Icourt permitted
the testimony at trial. See id. at 98 (explaining that expert was qualified and testi-
mony did not address credibility).
111. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 119.
112. 700 P.2d 1312 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
113. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 119-20 (identifying case law deemed relevant to
analysis) (citing State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1319-20 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc)).
114. Id. at 120 (quoting Roscoe, 700 P.2d at 1319). In finding that the evi-
dence was not bottomed on science, the Roscoe court stated that "[i]t was not the
theories of Newton, Einstein or Freud which gave the evidence weight; if so, the
Frye test should have been applied." Id. (quoting Roscoe, 700 P.2d at 1319).
115. See id. at 120 (stating that Roscoe court admitted evidence proffered by
"charlatan").
116. See id. (explaining that Frye or Daubert could have held testimony admissi-
ble). Specifically, the court stated that "[j]ust as the refusal to apply Frye to [the]
dog-scent evidence led to the admission of false testimony, so the application of
Frye or Daubert could well have led to the exclusion of testimony from Einstein or
Freud, both of whom advanced theories not generally accepted for many years."
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court of Arizona continued to distinguish between sci-
entific testimony and experience-based and observation-based testimony
in State v. Hummert,117 the next case relied upon by the Logerquist court.11 8
In Hummert, the court applied Fye to expert testimony on DNA matching
procedures and concluded that "expert opinion on probability percent-
ages based on computations derived from DNA statistics was inadmissi-
ble."' 19 The court excluded the testimony because the statistics employed
were a "process or formula established by others and not generally ac-
knowledged by scientists and statisticians in the field."1 20 Nevertheless,
the Hummert court relied on Roscoe to permit the experts to testify that the
matching results of the DNA testing were unusual because the experts'
testimony was based on experience and observation.121
2. The Court Regards As Relevant Arizona Civil Cases Involving Syndrome
Evidence
The Logerquist court then boosted its reliance on ARE 702 by pointing
to civil cases employing a relevancy analysis to opinion testimony on
CSAAS and RTS. 22 Specifically, the court emphasized its holding in State
v. Varela,12 3 and noted that the Varela court held Frye inapplicable to gen-
eral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims because such evidence is
not "'new, novel or experimental scientific evidence." 124 The court also
relied on its holding in State v. Huey,1 25 which concerned expert testimony
on RTS. 126 The court explained that the Huey court recognized the disa-
greement among the states on whether to permit testimony on RTS to
prove whether a rape occurred.1 27 Although not allowing the expert to
117. 933 P.2d 1187 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc).
118. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 120 (identifying case law deemed relevant to anal-
ysis); see also Eckstein & Thumma, supra note 65, at 18 (citing to Roscoe, Hummert
and other cases to explain Arizona's distinction between scientific and non-scien-
tific evidence).
119. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 120.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 120-21 (quoting Hummert, 933 P.2d at 1192-93 (citations
omitted)).
122. See id. at 121-22 (discussing civil cases regarding syndrome evidence).
123. 873 P.2d 657 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
124. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 121 (quoting Varela, 873 P.2d at 663-64). The Loger-
quist court also relied on another Arizona case in which the court allowed expert
testimony on behavioral characteristics of child molesters and their victims. See id.
at 121 (citing State v. Tucker, 798 P.2d 1349 (Ariz. App. 1990)). The Logerquist
court emphasized that in both Varela and Tucker the testimony was admissible only
to aid the jury in understanding the victim's behavior following the alleged trau-
matic event, and not as evidence that rape or child abuse occurred. See id. (ex-
plaining limitation of admissibility of syndrome evidence).
125. 699 P.2d 1290 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
126. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 121 (giving facts of Huey).
127. See id. at 122 (stating holding in Huey).
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testify as to the ultimate issue of rape, the Huey court permitted the expert
to opine about the impact of PTSD on a rape victim's behavior.
128
3. The Court Identifies Analogous Case Law in Other Jurisdictions
The Logerquist court identified three cases from other jurisdictions
that it deemed relevant to its analysis.129 First, the court focused on a
Colorado case that permitted physician testimony on relevancy grounds
because the physician's observations informed his opinion, not "'any
novel or newly developed scientific device or process.'"130 Second, the
court recognized that California had rendered a decision analogous to
Huey, in which it permitted an expert to explain a rape victim's behavior
following the trauma, but disallowed opinions on whether a rape oc-
curred.13 1 Third, the court relied upon the decision of the California
Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Phillips,132 because the case was "directly on
point" and demonstrated that Frye was inapplicable to "expert opinion that
the circumstances and plaintiffs' behavior [are] 'consistent with other in-
dividuals who had repressed their memories of childhood sexual
abuse.' "133
4. The Court Explains the Application of ARE 702 to Expert Testimony on
Repressed Memories
The court concluded that Arizona law did not require a Frye hearing
when an expert offered testimony based on inductive reasoning.134 Such
a hearing was appropriate only when deductive reasoning informed the
expert's opinions.135 The court clarified its holding by emphasizing its
decision in Hummert that Frye applied only when the expert "reaches a con-
clusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the work or
128. See id. (explaining holding in Huey).
129. See id. at 122-23 (explaining applicability of case law from other
jurisdictions).
130. Id. at 122 (quoting Colwell v. Mentzer Investments, Inc., 973 P.2d 631, 636
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998)). The court rendered Colwell relevant because the case con-
tained "operative facts [that] are quite similar to those in this case." Id. at 122.
Colwell was a medical causation case in which a physician testified, "based on expe-
rience, observation, and study of literature ... [that] stress could trigger otherwise
asymptomatic multiple sclerosis." Id. The Colwell court applied a reliability inquiry
under the state's expert testimony rule that did not turn upon general acceptance,
but required the testimony aid the jury and not overwhelm or mislead thejury. See
id. (explaining holding in Colwell). The court permitted the testimony after noting
that the physician qualified as an expert and that he testified only to his observa-
tions and not to "any novel or newly developed scientific device or process." Id.
(quoting Colwell, 973 P.2d at 636).
131. See id. at 122 (citing People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 298-99 (Cal. 1984)).
132. 73 Cal. App. 4th 250 (1999), cert. denied, No. S081229, 1999 Cal. LEXIS
7143, at *1 (Oct. 6, 1999).
133. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 122-23 (quoting Wilson, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 253).
134. See id. at 133 (summarizing holdings in case).
135. See id. at 123, 133 (explaining application of Frye).
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discovery of others."13 6 When experts base their testimony on "'their own
experimentation and observation and opinions based on their own
work,"' they need not show general acceptance. 137
The court ended its analysis of the admissibility of the Frye standard by
applying the articulated relevancy test to the testimony of the plaintiff's
witness, Dr. Bessel A. van der Kolk. 1 8 The court held that Dr. van der
Kolk qualified as an expert on repressed memories based on his educa-
tion, experience and eminent recognition in the fields of psychology and
medicine. 139 The court also noted that the plaintiff planned to call Dr.
van der Kolk to testify only to his observations and experience with per-
sons who claim to suffer from repressed memory. 140 Therefore, the court
concluded that the plaintiff could call Dr. van der Kolk as a witness "to
testify to his opinions based on the results of his experience, his observa-
tions, his own research and that of others with which he is familiar, and
the care of his patients." 14 1
In summarizing its conclusions on the Frye issue, the court empha-
sized that repressed memories involve a non-scientific issue, thereby not
requiring Frye analysis. 142 Nevertheless, the majority expressed skepticism
about the validity of such testimony.' 4 3 The majority agreed with the dis-
senters that heightened scrutiny should apply to repressed memory testi-
mony, but concluded that cross-examination would sufficiently test the
validity of the proffered testimony. 1 44
B. The Logerquist Court Refuses to Incorporate a Reliability Standard
into ARE 702
Because the court held that ARE 702 applied to the expert testimony,
the court next declined to read Daubert/Kumho into ARE 702 for four rea-
sons. 145 First, the court emphasized the lack of consensus among scholars
on the aptness of the rationale and conclusions of the Daubert and Kumho
136. Id. at 123 (citing State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Ariz. 1997) (en
banc)).
137. Id. at 123 (quoting Hummert, 933 P.2d at 1195).
138. See id. at 124 (applying ARE 702 to proffered testimony).
139. See id. (applying ARE 702 to proffered testimony). The court also at-
tached Dr. van der Kolk's curriculum vitae to the opinion and relied upon it to
find that he qualified as an expert. See id. at 124.
140. See id. (applying ARE 702 to proffered testimony).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 133 ("This case turns on a non-scientific issue.").
143. See id. at 134 (stating that "most reasonable position, scientific or un-
scientific, is to maintain skepticism about Plaintiffs claims").
144. See id. (saying that jury should assess validity of repressed memories de-
spite court's skepticism of testimony).
145. See id. at 124-33 (refusing to incorporate Daubert into ARE 702). Before
addressing the reasons for rejecting Daubert, the court first reviewed the federal
development of evidentiary standards regarding expert testimony and then out-
lined Arizona's development of evidentiary standards. See id. at 124-25.
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opinions.146 Second, the court maintained that unlike FRE 702, ARE 702
did not incorporate a reliability standard based on the language of the
rule, the intent of the drafters and subsequent case law applying ARE
702.147 Third, the court asserted that a reliability component was not nec-
essary because Arizona law applied the general acceptance standard con-
servatively, thereby eliminating confusion on its application. 1 48 Finally,
the court concluded that a Daubert analysis would not prevent unreliable
evidence from reaching the jury because judges lacked the training to per-
form substantive evaluations and the time to conduct exhaustive eviden-
tiary hearings.' 49
146. See id. at 125 (explaining that "Daubert and its progeny have not been
received with unanimous approbation"). The court explained that scholars have
criticized Daubert because it drastically changed the trial court's approach to evi-
dence by placing a higher burden upon the court. See id. at 125-26 (discussing
criticisms of Daubert)). Additionally, the court noted that the United States Su-
preme Court did not reconcile Kumho with an earlier United States Supreme Court
case. See id. at 126 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1993)). In Bare-
foot, the court permitted psychiatric testimony on dangerousness despite the posi-
tion of the APA that "psychiatrists 'are incompetent to predict [such future
behavior] with any acceptable degree of reliability.'" Id. at 126 (quoting Barefoot,
463 U.S. at 898).
The Logerquist court recognized that the United States Supreme Court may
have intended to distinguish between criminal and civil cases. See id. at 127 (ex-
plaining possible rationale for reconciling Barefoot and Kumho). Consequently, ex-
pert testimony in criminal cases, as in Barefoot, must pass relevancy analysis,
whereas expert testimony in civil cases, as in Kumho, must satisfy Frye. See id. at 127
(giving possible rationale for reconciling Barefoot and Kumho). Nevertheless, the
court emphasized that Arizona case law did not impose different evidentiary stan-
dards on expert testimony based on nature of the suit, nor did the court recognize
such disparity as necessary. See id. (stating that Arizona case law differs from fed-
eral case law).
147. See id. at 128 (differentiating ARE 702 from FRE 702). Before distin-
guishing ARE 702 from FRE 702, the court questioned whether the United States
Supreme Court correctly interpreted a reliability standard into FRE 702. See id.
The court noted that neither the text nor the commentary to the rule referenced a
reliability standard, and early attempts at a federal evidentiary framework never
addressed this component. See id. (criticizing enactment of reliability standard in
Daubert).
148. See id. at 128-29 (giving rationale for not incorporating Daubert into ARE
702).
149. See id. at 129-30 (doubting whether Daubert/Kumho will prevent "junk sci-
ence" from reaching jury). The court next explained in dicta that even if judges
were capable of evaluating the reliability of evidence, Daubert and its progeny re-
move from the jury its constitutionally protected right to weigh the evidence and
its credibility. See id. at 130. The court interpreted Kumho and Joiner to mandate
that the judge inquire into the reliability and credibility of qualified witnesses,
thereby encroaching on duties relegated to the jury. See id. at 131 (stating that
decisions by United States Supreme Court encroach on duties of jury). The court
emphasized, however, that it did not reject Daubert or its progeny on constitutional
grounds. See id. at 132 (saying that constitutional conclusions are dicta).
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2001] NOTE
C. The Logerquist Court Disputes the Appropriateness of ARE 70 and the
Rejection of Daubert
In a concurring opinion, Vice ChiefJustice Jones, joined by ChiefJus-
tice Zlaket, agreed that ARE 702 applied to the expert testimony at issue,
but wrote separately to emphasize their concerns with Daubert and
Kumho.15 0 The justices intimated, however, that their cynicism about
Daubert and Kumho was not solidified. 15 ' They will remain skeptical of the
decisions, "at least until a solid measure of acceptable consistency emerges
under their application."1
52
In a dissenting opinion,Justice Martone raised several concerns about
the majority's decision. 15 3 First, the distinction that governed whether
Frye or ARE 702 applied would produce incomprehensible evidentiary rul-
ings that would permit unreliable evidence to reach the jury.' 5 4 Second,
the majority improperly interpreted Arizona case law that actually sup-
ported applying Frye before admitting opinion testimony on an issue. 155
150. See id. at 134 (Jones, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority opinion).
The concurring judges emphasized their "sense of resistance to the Daubert princi-
ple because it gives the trial judge, a non-expert in scientific matters, near absolute
power to make a one-person determination of what is and what is not valid sci-
ence." Id. at 136 (Jones, J., concurring).
151. See id. at 136 (Jones, J., concurring) (explaining viewpoint on Daubert
and Kumho).
152. Id. (Jones, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 136-40 (Martone, J., dissenting) (explaining rationale for refus-
ing to join majority).
154. See id. at 137 (Martone, J., dissenting) (exposing flaws in majority analy-
sis). Specifically, Judge Martone emphasized that the majority failed to recognize
that inductive reasoning is essential to the scientific method, thereby rendering
observation and experience difficult to separate from science. See id. (Martone,J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's analysis). Additionally, Judge Martone asserted
that the court should have applied Frye to Dr. van Der Kolk's testimony because his
testimony included references to studies documented in the scientific literature.
See id. (Martone,J., dissenting) (holding that expert testimony in present case was
based on science).
155. See id. at 137-38 (Martone, J., dissenting) (expressing different views on
application of Hummert, Lindsey and Roscoe to present case). Specifically, Judge
Martone emphasized that Hummert allowed expert testimony matches in DNA evi-
dence under Frye, but limited testimony on statistical probability because those
techniques were not generally accepted. See id. at 137 (Martone, J., dissenting)
(explaining holding in Hummert). Consequently, the opinion testimony regarding
the DNA matching results was proper because the court had admitted the scien-
tific matching testimony. See id. (Martone, J., dissenting) (same). Judge Martone
asserted that Hummert required the trial court to assess the admissibility of re-
pressed memories before permitting opinion testimony on behavioral characteris-
tics of repressed child victims of sexual abuse. See id. at 137-38 (Martone, J.,
dissenting) (explaining appropriate application of Hummert to present case).
Judge Martone also distinguished Lindsey by emphasizing that the child incest
testimony in Lindsey was based on recognized principles of behavioral science. See
id. at 138 (Martone, J., dissenting) (explaining distinction between present case
and Lindsey). In contrast, "[riepressed memory has not been generally recog-
nized. It is a new and controversial theory which attempts to explain the brain's
response to trauma under the banner of science." Id. (Martone, J., dissenting).
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More importantly, the decision by the California Court of Appeals that
required repressed memory testimony pass relevancy analysis lacked per-
suasive authority in view of the unanimous application of a high-level stan-
dard by other jurisdictions. 156 Therefore, Justice Martone found that Frye
applied and that repressed memory testimony could not satisfy the stan-
dard.157 Justice Martone concluded his analysis by emphasizing that the
time was ripe for Arizona to adopt Daubert and that trial judges have the
time and skills necessary to conduct reliability hearings. 158
Finally, Justice McGregor filed a dissenting opinion in which she em-
phasized three deleterious results from the majority's opinion.159 First, by
rejecting Daubert, Arizona became one of the few states retaining Frye,
thereby stripping Arizona from judicial discourse on the development of
evidence laws related to expert testimony. 160 Second, Frye limited the ad-
missibility of "reliable, but newly-developed, scientific principles," to which
Daubert's more flexible standard was amenable.1 6 1 Third, admitting unre-
liable testimony under a low-level evidentiary standard undermined the
legal system's assurance to preserve justice. 162
V. CRITicAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Arizona improperly concluded that expert tes-
timony on repressed memories requires a low-level relevancy standard.1 63
Additionally, Judge Martone emphasized that Roscoe permitted invalid testimony to
reach the jury, a conclusion the court could have avoided by requiring "a prelimi-
nary showing of reliability." See id. (Martone, J., dissenting) (explaining effect of
Roscoe decision).
156. See id. at 137 (Martone, J., dissenting) (noting that majority overlooked
numerous state supreme court rulings on admissibility of repressed memory testi-
mony and, instead, favored ruling of one state intermediate court).
157. See id. at 138-39 (Martone, J., dissenting) (applying Frye to repressed
memories).
158. See id. at 139-40 (Martone,J., dissenting) (giving rationale for Arizona to
adopt Daubert).
159. See id. at 140-42 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (explaining problems gener-
ated by majority opinion).
160. See id. at 141 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (stating that Arizona has placed
itself "within a tiny minority of jurisdictions that have chosen to adopt a unique
interpretation of Rule 702"). In addition to limiting Arizona's opportunity to in-
form judicial discourse on evidentiary issues, Judge McGregor expressed concern
that the majority's ruling would cause distinct differences between federal and
state decisions in Arizona. See id. at 141 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (explaining
effect of majority opinion).
161. Id. at 141 (McGregor, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 141-42 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (worrying that unreliable testi-
mony has deleterious effect on legal system). Judge McGregor also expressed con-
cern that the majority read Daubert too broadly when the majority emphasized that
Daubert permitted the trial judge to assess credibility. See id. at 142 (McGregor, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that Daubert requires the trial judge to assess scientific va-
lidity, not credibility).
163. See id. at 134 (holding that ARE 702 applies to repressed memory
testimony).
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The court should have applied Frye based on its holding in Hummert, in
which the court held that expert DNA testimony founded on statistical
probability calculations must satisfy the general acceptance standard.16 4
Similar to DNA statistical calculations, scholars have researched and dis-
cussed the repressed memory phenomenon for a number of years; yet, the
phenomenon still lacks general acceptance. 16 5 Moreover, like DNA statis-
tical testing, the repressed memory phenomenon has generated consider-
able debate in the scientific community.166
The court also could not circumvent Fye by finding that repressed
memory testimony involves a non-scientific issue. 167 Such a result over-
looks the empirical work that the psychological and psychiatric communi-
ties have conducted on repressed memories.' 68 Furthermore, even if
"repressed memories has its roots in clinical therapy, a domain in which
validity is not a factor of overriding concern," it nonetheless involves ob-
servation-the starting point for scientific reasoning. 169
In addition to failing to apply Frye to repressed memory testimony, the
court also failed to explain why the decisions of the federal district courts
and state supreme courts involving repressed memories do not inform its
164. See State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (hold-
ing testimony based on DNA statistical calculations inadmissible under Frye); State
v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-89 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (finding testimony based
on DNA statistical calculations inadmissible under Frye).
165. Compare Bible, 858 P.2d at 1187 ("[The DNA statistical calculations] at
issue are not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community."), with State
v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916, 928 (N.H. 1997) ("We cannot say that the [repressed
memory] phenomenon has gained acceptance in the psychological community.").
166. Compare Bible, 858 P.2d at 1187 (explaining that conflicting studies and
views have created "controversy" in scientific community on DNA statistical test-
ing), with Hungerford, 697 A.2d at 925 (stating that "level of [publication] submis-
sion is high, but the debate over methodology and the meaning of results
continues").
167. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 133 ("This case turns on a non-scientific issue.").
One scholar argues that courts should refrain from asking whether the field consti-
tutes a science. See Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurispru-
dence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 239 (2000). Rather, Michael Saks
sees true development in expert testimony jurisprudence requiring courts to "ask
whether a field addresses an empirical matter, and, if so, what evidence demon-
strates how well it can perform with respect to that empirical matter." Id.
168. See generally WORKING GROUP ON INVESTIGATION OF MEMORIES OF CHILD-
HOOD ABUSE, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, FINAL REPORT (1996) (providing overview
and criticism of empirical literature on repressed memories from proponent and
opponent perspective).
169. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 133 (citations omitted); see also Marilee M. Kapsa &
Carl B. Meyers, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L.
REv. 313, 325 (1999) (explaining that "border between scientific and [non-scien-
tific testimony] is fluid"); Michael H. Graham, The Daubert Dilemma: At Last a
Viable Solution, 179 FED. RULES DECISIONS 1, 11 (1998) ("To conclude that 'no
methodology or technique,' i.e. explanative theory, is involved with respect to
opinion testimony presenting 'scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge'
is simply untenable." (citations omitted)).
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holding.' 70 One possible distinguishing feature of these cases is that they
were decided by states employing a Daubert or Daubert-like analysis to ex-
pert testimony.17 ' Yet, the court elected to rely upon a California case,
which turns upon a distinction that has yet to inform when Frye applies
under Arizona law. 172
Even if ARE 702 applies to repressed memory testimony, the court
made two questionable omissions and assumptions in refusing to adopt
Daubert.173 First, although the court recognized that Arizona law places
constraints on when evidentiary standards apply to expert testimony, it
failed to recognize that Arizona is not completely inseparable from the
laws of other jurisdictions. 174 For instance, states that have applied Frye in
the past have recently replaced it with a Daubert or Daubert-like analysis.
175
Arizona will likely follow suit because the concurring justices are open to
adopting Daubert in the future. 176
Second, judges are in a more informed position to assess the validity
of repressed memories than the jury.1 77 Judges receive training and
170. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 115-16 (citing cases addressing admissibility of
repressed memory testimony but providing no analysis of their conclusions).
171. See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 287-90 (D. Mass. 1996) (apply-
ing reliability standard); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1064-66
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (same); State v. Walters, 698 A.2d 1244, 1246-48 (N.H. 1997)
(same); Hungerford, 697 A.2d at 925-34 (same); State v. Quattrocchi, No. P92-3759,
1999 WL 284882, at *9-16 (R.I. Apr. 26, 1999) (applying reliability and general
acceptance standard); Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, 27-28 (Utah 1999) (ap-
plying reliability standard).
172. See Eckstein & Thumma, supra note 65, at 18 (explaining Arizona's dis-
tinction between types of expert testimony but making no reference in text or
footnotes to cases that develop distinction analogous to California law). Arizona
has permitted medical and psychological testimony under ARE 702, but has not
determined that this type of testimony automatically requires low-level admissibility
analysis. See State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (Ariz. 1986) (admitting psychologi-
cal testimony); State v. Hummer, 911 P.2d 609, 613 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (admit-
ting medical testimony).
173. See Logerquist, I P.3d at 128-29 (holding that reliability component is not
necessary and trial judges lack training to conduct complex evaluations of scien-
tific evidence).
174. See id. at 128 (recognizing that case law narrowly applies Frye). Arizona
courts, like courts adopting Daubert, have criticized Frye and, although Arizona
does not adopt Daubert, the courts appear to apply a test "for considering novel
scientific expert evidence that might be described as the 'Fraubert' test." Eckstein
& Thumma, supra note 65, at 19, 42.
175. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402-03 (Alaska 1999) (applying Daubert
to sound spectrograph); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) (applying
Daubert to polygraphs); State v. Begley, 956 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tenn. 1997) (apply-
ing Daubert to DNA evidence).
176. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 136 (Jones, J., concurring) (explaining that
court's skepticism of Daubert may expire).
177. SeeJacqueline Hough, Note, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse:
Applying the Daubert Standard in State Courts, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 855, 877 (1996)
(countering doubts about inability of judges to assess reliability by focusing on
available tools, training and experience).
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manuals on scientific evidence, can permit the filing of supplemental
Brandeis briefs to provide general background information on the prof-
fered testimony, and can appoint an expert to assist the court in its analy-
sis. 178 Moreover, as the majority in Logerquist emphasized, judges are often
called upon to render decisions regarding complex issues not commonly
recognized as falling within their expertise. 179 To expect that a jury, lack-
ing the additional training, assistance and experience offered to judges,
can evaluate an area of expertise in which no consensus exists is highly
specious. i8 0
Even if the court correctly rejected Daubert, the court misapplied ARE
702 based on the language of prior case law. 18 ' Specifically, in Hummert,
178. See Faigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-3.8, at 43-45 (1997), 24-25 (2000
Supp.) (discussing role of court-appointed experts under rules of evidence);
Hough, supra note 177, at 877-79 (identifying factors supporting and undermining
judges as gatekeepers). See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCI-
ENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994) (providing guide to assist judges in assessing admissibility
of scientific evidence); JOEL S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (1993) (providing guide to assist judges in utilizing
court-appointed experts); John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of
Gatekeeping: The Federal Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74
N.C. L. REv. 1183 (1996) (reviewing manual published by Federal Judicial Center
and providing praise and criticism for its contents); Second Annual AppellateJudges
and Lawyers Symposium: Scientific Methodology and the Admissibility of Expert Testimony:
Setting the Stage: Frye, Daubert, and the States, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 2 (1999)
(capturing speeches presented to judges and attorneys at symposium on admissi-
bility of scientific evidence). But see Mark Lewis & Mark Kitrick, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael: Blowout from the Overinflation of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 79, 93-94 (1999) (criticizing unfettered control Daubert
grants to judges and surmising that "[j]udges have been placed in an unnecessarily
demanding new role").
Brandeis briefs are supplemental briefs submitted to the court to provide gen-
eral information regarding relevant social phenomena. See, e.g., Hough, supra note
177, at 877-78 (noting that Brandeis briefs on repressed memories "may be valua-
ble in informing the judge about the phenomena of repression and delayed recall
theory generally as well as the phenomenon of false memory theory"). These
briefs are named after Justice Louis Brandeis, who, prior to serving on the United
States Supreme Court, filed briefs with the Court regarding non-legal authority
relevant to particular cases. See id. at 877 n.89 (explaining purpose of Brandeis
briefs).
179. See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 128-29 (holding that trial court judges are capa-
ble of "making prompt and accurate Frye determinations in even the most difficult
and arcane disciplines").
180. See Lazo, supra note 1, at 1402 ("If both parties call experts who give
conflicting testimony, the ensuing battle of the experts may confuse rather than
convince the jury.").
181. Compare State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)
(holding that ARE 702 permits "experts [to] testify concerning their own experimen-
tation and observation and opinions based on their own work" (emphasis added)),
with Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 124 (holding that Dr. van der Kolk "can be asked to testify
to his opinions based on the results of his experience, his observations, his own
research and that of others with which he is familiar, and the care of his patients"
(emphasis added)).
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the court limited testimony admissible under ARE 702 to the expert's own
experimentation and observations and excludes testimony based on "the
work or discovery of others."' 82 The court foreshadowed this limitation in
Roscoe, in which the court noted that published studies on dog tracking
evidence existed to support the expert's opinions, but "the scientific data
was not [offered as] the basis of the foundation for the evidence nor for its
presentation to the jury."' 83 The language from these cases insinuates
that reliance on studies, particularly those conducted by third parties,
likely guides whether the testimony satisfies ARE 702.
This focus on studies appears akin to decisions by the Supreme Court
of Florida that involve expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases.' 8 4
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Florida held that testimony on the be-
haviors of child victims of sexual abuse is admissible on relevancy grounds
when that testimony is pure opinion testimony based solely on training
and experience. 85 The court stressed, however, that testimony based on
studies and tests, combined with testimony based on training and experi-
ence, does not constitute pure opinion testimony. 186 Consistent with the
language in Roscoe and Hummert as well as the Supreme Court of Florida's
analysis, Dr. van der Kolk's testimony did not qualify as opinion testimony
because he intended to rely on studies conducted by others.18 7 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court of Arizona should have held the expert testi-
mony inadmissible under ARE 702.
VI. IMPACT/CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Arizona should have upheld the trial court's
order to exclude expert testimony on repressed memories under Frye or
should have remanded the case for a hearing consistent with Daubert.1 88
182. Hummert, 933 P.2d at 1195.
183. State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1320 n.2 (Ariz. 1984).
184. See Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-78 (Fla. 1997) (discussing Flor-
ida's adherence to Frye despite adoption of state rules of evidence); see also Holds-
worth, supra note 7, at 124-25 (comparing decision by Florida Supreme Court on
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome with repressed memory testimony);
Steele, supra note 8, at 968-69 (explaining Florida's approach to expert testimony).
185. See Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 580 (examining distinction between pure opin-
ion testimony and scientific testimony); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993) (same).
186. See Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 580-81 (stating that expert's testimony went
beyond pure opinion testimony); Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828 (differentiating be-
tween pure opinion testimony and profile testimony); see also Steele, supra note 8,
at 968 (explaining that Florida's distinction differentiates opinion testimony
"based solely upon the experience of the expert" and opinion testimony "based
upon experience as well as knowledge of clinical studies performed by third
parties").
187. See Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 117 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (repro-
ducing letter by Dr. van der Kolk to Logerquist's attorney explaining basis for his
testimony).
188. See id. at 136 (Martone, J., dissenting) (holding that court should have
affirmed trial court ruling or should have remanded case for Daubert hearing).
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Instead, the court admitted the testimony on relevancy grounds after ap-
plying an unclear distinction between scientific testimony and experience-
based or observation-based testimony that likely will generate a myriad of
interpretations by Arizona courts.18 9 Consequently, the Logerquist decision
provides a good example of the United States Supreme Court's concern
that discriminating between the types of expert testimony is "unlikely to
produce clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases." 9 0
The Logerquist decision not only has removed Arizona from judicial
discourse on evidentiary issues involving expert testimony, but also has ef-
fectively created an approach that reaches far beyond the boundaries of
the state. Although a majority of states have adopted a reliability compo-
nent into their evidentiary scheme, several states still retain Frye, and a few
states have yet to render a decision on this issue.19 ' The decision of the
Supreme Court of Arizona may influence these courts to take a circuitous
route to avoid addressing the reliability of repressed memories. 1 92 Even
those states that have adopted Daubert can read the ruling in Logerquist as
an invitation to find new ways of dealing with whole categories of evidence
that it deems inappropriate for reliability analysis.' 93
The Logerquist decision also will significantly impact persons defend-
ing against claims of childhood sexual abuse. Admitting testimony of
questionable validity increases the risk of false accusations of abuse and
subsequent adverse verdicts. 1 94 In fact, individuals wrongly accused of
childhood sexual abuse are now seeking redress from therapists for im-
planting the memories. 19 5 No amount of monetary compensation, how-
189. See id. at 141 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that "dis-
tinction will [not] prove useful and suspect it will produce inexplicable evidentiary
rulings").
190. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).
191. SeeFaigman et al., supra note 20, § 1-3.0 at 11-12 n.7 (1997), 3 n.4 (Supp.
2000) (identifying how states divide on what evidentiary standard applies).
192. Cf. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 122-23 (relying on California case that first ap-
plied relevancy standard to expert testimony on repressed memories).
193. Cf Mary L. Tenopyr, A Scientist-Practitioner's Viewpoint on the Admissibility of
Behavioral and Social Scientific Information, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 194, 200
(1999) (examining impact of Daubert on behavioral science evidence and warning
that "failure of many courts to apply Daubert to clinical testimony can lead to an
illogical and potentially unfair treatment of different types of evidence").
194. See Carro & Hatala, supra note 4, at 1270 ("Without question, many per-
sons have been falsely accused of sexually abusing their children or other minors
since repressed memory therapy became an oft-used psychotherapeutic tech-
nique."). Carro and Hatala point out that statistics indicate the number of accusa-
tions of childhood sexual abuse increased from a total of 250 by March 1992 to
11,000 by March 1994. See id. (explaining need to protect falsely accused). A large
number of these accusations may represent the falsely accused. See Victor Dricks,
False "Memories" of Sexual Abuse Rip Families Apart; "Syndrome" Sparks Heated Debate,
PHOENIX GAZETrE, Mar. 25, 1993, at Al (estimating that number of falsely accused
sexual abusers may reach as high as 20,000 total).
195. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories Shattered
Lives, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (1993) (discussing cases related to accused sexual abuser
seeking money damages from therapist for implanting false memories of abuse);
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ever, can overcome the pervasive harm generated from the stigma of
being an accused child sexual abuser.
196
Child sexual abuse is tragic and undeniable, and courts should at-
tempt to remedy the harm caused to innocent victims. 1 97 The Arizona
Supreme Court, however, overlooks the need to ensure the reliability of
expert testimony and, as a result, places the accuracy of decisions in re-
pressed child sexual abuse cases at issue. 198 Other jurisdictions should
Larry B. Spikes & Angela L. Rud, "Restored Recollections": Claims Based on Repressed
Memories of Abuse, 62 DEF. COUNSEL J. 89, 89 (1995) (same). A California jury
awarded $500,000 to a father who sued his daughter's therapists for implanting
false memories of sexual abuse. See Loftus & Rosenwald, supra, at 70 (giving facts
of case).
196. See David F. Partlett, Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse and Liability:
Society, Science, and the Law in a Comparative Setting, 4 PsYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1253,
1286 (1998) (looking at deleterious effect on accused created by litigating re-
pressed child sexual abuse claims). Litigation of repressed child sexual abuse cases
stigmatizes and defames the accused, thereby inflicting psychological, financial
and material harm. See id. (identifying deleterious effects of accusing person of
sexual abuse). Accusations destroy the family structure, with alleged victims sever-
ing relations for a significant period. See Dricks, supra note 194, at Al (reporting
that Arizona State University professor accused of incest by his adult daughter had
little contact with her for year after she recovered memories of abuse). In addition
to the social ramifications that accusations generate, they also compel the accused
to enter a legal arena weighed heavily against him or her. See Carro & Hatala,
supra note 4, at 1270 (explaining imbalance in vigorously "respect[ing] the adult
survivor of incest," but granting less vigilance in protecting individuals falsely ac-
cused of sexual abuse). David F. Partlett stresses that, "[e]ven though the accusa-
tions may not be established, the mobilization of legal machinery, opportunity for
privileged press scrutiny and publication, and societal opprobrium are damage
enough." Partlett, supra, at 1287.
197. See Judith L. Alpert et al., Final Conclusions of the American Psychological
Association Working Group on Investigation of Memories of Child Abuse, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB..
POL'Y & L. 933, 933 (1998) ("Controversies regarding adult recollections should
not be allowed to obscure the fact that childhood sexual abuse is a complex and
pervasive problem in America that has historically gone unacknowledged."). See
generally Angela Browne & David Finkelhor, The Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A
Review of the Research, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 66-77 (1986) (reviewing empirical studies
on effects of childhood sexual abuse and finding deleterious long-term and short-
term effects, including fear, depression, psychopathology and self-destructive
behavior).
198. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 838 (Pa. 1992) (excluding
expert testimony that explains why child victims of sexual abuse delay or omit re-
porting, while recognizing gravity of childhood sexual abuse in society). In the
context of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases, courts must balance the
need to protect young victims and the need to uphold the judicial process. See id.
(explaining that protecting child victims of sexual abuse cannot come at price of
judicial process). As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
We are all aware that child abuse is a plague in our society and one of the
saddest aspects of growing up in today's America. Nevertheless, we do
not think it befits this Court to simply disregard long-standing principles
concerning the presumption of innocence and the proper admission of
evidence in order to gain a greater number of convictions. A conviction
must be obtained through the proper and lawful admission of evidence
in order to maintain the integrity and fairness that is the bedrock of our
[Vol. 46: p. 385
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follow the lead of the federal district courts and state supreme courts that
apply a high-level evidentiary standard to repressed memory testimony.
Tomika N. Stevens
jurisprudence. No shortcuts are permissible that erode this concept, no
matter how noble the purpose.
Id.
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